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Contracting is a game that permits the players to change
the rules while the game is underway. Following contract forma-
tion, the parties may modify their contract by mutual consent. A
party seeking to enforce a modification in his favor, however,
may be met with the defense that the modification is voidable
because of duress.
Duress is an elusive concept. It surely involves wrongful co-
ercion, but we encounter difficulty when we try to identify the
forms of coercion that are wrongful. The tests provided by con-
temporary contract law render modifications voidable when co-
ercion clearly assumes an oppressive aspect, but these tests fail
to produce determinate results when the moral coloration is not
clear. This article offers a new approach to the problem and
shows that, in the context of contract modification, duress is not
a concept beyond our comprehension.
I. THE NEED FOR A CLEAR DURESS TEST
A. The Pre-existing Duty Rule
In the past, courts often used the pre-existing duty rule to
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nullify coercive modifications. A contract modification is itself a
contract requiring consideration, and the pre-existing duty rule
proclaims that a promise to do what one is already legally obli-
gated to do is not valid consideration.1 Thus, a buyer's amenda-
tory promise to pay a higher price is unenforceable if, in return,
the seller merely promises to render the same performance for
which he is obligated under the original contract.2 Corbin sug-
gests that the reason for refusing to recognize as consideration a
promise to perform a pre-existing duty is that such recognition
would encourage contractors to play a "holdup" game.s
The requirement of new consideration is merely a slight ob-
stacle, however, and not an effective deterrent to duress. A party
using duress can easily insert some minimal consideration into
the amendment terms. Despite the duress, the pre-existing duty
rule does not render such an amendment invalid. Moreover, the
absence of consideration renders unenforceable even an amend-
ment that is fair and not obtained by duress. In view of these
defects, it is not surprising that the pre-existing duty rule is gen-
1. Corbin states the pre-existing duty rule as follows: "neither the performance of
duty nor the promise to render a performance already required by duty is a sufficient
consideration for a return promise." IA A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 171, at 105
(1963).
2. Two classic cases illustrate the use of the pre-existing duty rule in nullifying coer-
cive amendments. In Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844
(1891), a brewing company made an amendatory promise to pay additional compensation
to an architect who refused to continue performance. The court held the amendment
unenforceable because of the lack of consideration and expressly noted the extortionate
nature of the amendment. Id. at 592, 15 S.W. at 848. In Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domen-
ico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902), an employer's amendatory promise to pay additional wages
to fishermen employees was held to be without consideration and thus unenforceable. Id.
at 102. The court obviously regarded the amendment as having been obtained by duress.
A good statement of the pre-existing duty rule in the contract modification context
is found in Angel v. Murray, 113 R.I. 482, 489, 322 A.2d 630, 634 (1974) (rejecting the pre-
existing duty rule in favor of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89D(a)(Tent. Draft
Nos. 1-7, 1973)(designated § 89(a) in the final version adopted in 1981)):
It is generally held that a modification of a contract is itself a contract, which
is unenforceable unless supported by consideration .... Under this rule an
agreement modifying a contract is not supported by consideration if one of the
parties to the agreement does or promises to do something that he is legally
obligated to do or refrains or promises to refrain from doing something he is
not legally privileged to do.
Id.
3. 1A A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 184, at 148 (1963). The thesis that prevention of
duress is a major function of the pre-existing duty rule is supported in Brody, Perform-
ance of a Pre-Existing Contractual Duty as Consideration: The Actual Criteria for the
Efficacy of an Agreement Altering Contractual Obligation, 52 DEN. L.J. 433 (1975).
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erally being replaced by the rules contained in section 2-209(1)
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and section 89(a) of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Restatement).
B. UCC Section 2-209(1)
Section 2-209(1) of the UCC provides that an "agreement
modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration
to be binding.' 4 Although the statutory text says nothing about
duress, Comment 2 to section 2-209 states that the modification
"must meet the test of good faith ... and the extortion of a
'modification' without legitimate commercial reason is ineffec-
tive as a violation of the duty of good faith." 5
The Comment seems to require a legitimate commercial rea-
son for the modification. Thus, if the seller obtains a price in-
crease amendment but has no legitimate commercial reason for
demanding any increase in the price, the amendment is unen-
forceable. What if the seller has a legitimate commercial reason
for demanding a $100 price increase but is able to extort a $2000
price increase from the buyer? Does section 2-209(1), as inter-
preted in Comment 2, require merely a legitimate commercial
reason for increasing the price, or does it require that the
amount of the price increase ($2000) be justified by some legiti-
mate commercial reason?
If the contract modification is to meet the test of good faith,
it would seem that the amendment terms (the amount of the
price increase) must be fair. This conclusion is suggested by the
UCC provisions dealing with good faith. The duty of good faith
is created by UCC section 1-203, which provides that every con-
.tract governed by the UCC "imposes an obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement."' In the case of a nonmer-
chant, "good faith" means honesty in fact.7 But in the case of a"
merchant engaged in a transaction governed by Article 2 of the
UCC, "good faith" means "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."8
4. U.C.C. § 2-209(1).
5. Id. § 2-209, Comment 2.
6. Id. § 1-203.
7. Id. § 1-201(19).
8. Id. § 2-103(1)(b). The term "merchant" is defined in U.C.C. § 2-104(1). Section 2-
103 expressly provides a definition of "good faith" only when that term is used in Article
1982]
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Assuming that the seller is a merchant, he thus has a good faith
duty not to extort an amendment that is unfair when viewed in
the light of reasonable commercial standards in the trade.
Judged by these standards, a price increase amendment might
well be unfair if the amount of the price increase grossly exceeds
the increase justified by the seller's legitimate commercial
reasons.
Section 2-209(1) of the UCC thus appears to impose two re-
quirements, both of which must be met if the amendment is to
be enforceable: (1) the party requesting the amendment must
have a legitimate commercial reason for requesting an amend-
ment; and (2) the amendment terms must be fair when viewed
in the context of that legitimate commercial reason and in light
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.9 Under UCC
section 2-209(1), consideration is not required; nor does the
presence of technical consideration validate an amendment
made in bad faith.10 Although the UCC approach thus avoids
the defects of the pre-existing duty rule, it is difficult to apply,
for reasons which will be discussed shortly."'
C. Restatement Section 89(a)
Section 89(a) of the Restatement states that a "promise
modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either
side is binding ... if the modification is fair and equitable in
view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the
contract was made."12 This rule is applied only to modifications
lacking consideration."3 At least one court has stated that it
2, and the term "good faith" is not used in the text of § 2-209. However, Comment 19 to
§ 1-201(19), the Comment to § 1-203, and Comment 2 to § 2-209 suggest that the § 2-
103(1)(b) definition of good faith applies to a merchant who modifies a contract governed
by Article 2.
9. The "fairness" requirement derived from § 2-103(1)(b) does not apply to consum-
ers who Beek to enforce contract amendments. Consumers, however, are seldom able to
obtain amendments from merchants by means of duress.
10. U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 2.
11. See notes 27-31 and accompanying text infra.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981)[hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT]. Section 89 was designated § 89D in the Tentative Draft of 1973.
13. Comment a to § 89 states that paragraph (a) of § 89 "deals with bargains which
are without consideration only because of the rule that performance of a legal duty to
the promisor is not consideration [the pre-existing duty rule in Restatement § 73]." RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 12, § 89, Comment a. Section 89 is designed to overcome the pre-
[Vol. 33
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"prohibits modifications obtained by coercion, duress, or extor-
tion .... "14
In order for an amendment to be enforceable under section
89(a), two important requirements must be met: (1) the reason
for the amendment must relate to circumstances not anticipated
when the original contract was formed; and (2) the amendment
must be fair" and equitable. Each of these requirements needs
further interpretation.
What are unanticipated circumstances? At first glance, this
would seem to be a narrower category than the "legitimate com-
mercial reasons" required under UCC section 2-209. Conceiva-
bly, a legitimate commercial reason might arise from intervening
circumstances that were anticipated. But it is not clear how nar-
row the unanticipated circumstances category is supposed to be.
Comment b to section 89 of the Restatement indicates that the
category includes some foreseen circumstances: an event may be
unanticipated "if it was not adequately covered, even though it
was foreseen as a remote possibility."1 5 What about an event
that was not adequately covered and was foreseen, not as a re-
mote possibility, but as a strong possibility? What about an
event that was not adequately covered and was foreseen as a
probability? Unfortunately, the Restatement Comments do not
answer these questions, and the extent of disparity between the
UCC concept of "legitimate commercial reason" and the Re-
statement concept of "unanticipated circumstances" is
uncertain.""
existing duty rule in appropriate situations.
14. Angel v. Murray, 113 R.I. 482, 493, 322 A.2d 630, 636 (1974).
15. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 89, Comment b.
16. For a comparison of the U.C.C. and the Restatement on this point, see J. MUR-
RAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 88 (1974).
Under the pre-existing duty rule, courts often recognized an exception to the rule
and deemed amendments lacking consideration to be enforceable when "unforeseen cir-
cumstances" existed. See, e.g., Grand Trunk W.R.R. v. H.W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823
(6th Cir.), rehearing denied, 118 F.2d 252 (1941); Lange v. United States ex reL. Wilkin-
son, 120 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1941); Blakeslee v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 106 Conn. 642,
139 A. 106 (1927); Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 206 Md. 610, 112 A.2d 901
(1955); King v. Duluth, Missabe & N. Ry., 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W. 1105 (1895). In other
decisions, however, the exception to the pre-existing duty rule seems limited to situa-
tions in which the unforeseen circumstances were not "foreseeable." See, e.g., Pittsburgh
Testing Laboratory v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 251 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1958); Dahl v.
Edwin Moss & Son, 136 Conn. 147, 69 A.2d 562 (1949); Linz v. Schuck, 106 Md. 220, 67
A. 286 (1907). "Unforeseen circumstances" are not necessarily "circumstances not fore-
1982] 619
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How is it determined whether an amendment is "fair and
equitable"? Presumably, the amendment terms must be fair.
Comment b to section 89 indicates that the "fair and equitable"
limitation "goes beyond absence of coercion and requires an ob-
jectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification."'17 The
use of the indefinite article "a," rather than "the," might suggest
that the particular amendment is not to be scrutinized for fair-
ness, so long as the circumstances justified a request for some
amendment. If the circumstances justify only a $100 price in-
crease, however, it is difficult to see how a $2000 price increase
can be regarded as "fair and equitable in view of circumstances
not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made." It
would thus appear that the amendment terms must be fair when
viewed in the context of the reason for the amendment and in
light of the standards of fairness applied by the court.
The two requirements of section 89 can therefore be refor-
mulated as follows: (1) the reason for the amendment must re.-
late to circumstances not anticipated (whatever that means)
when the original contract was formed; and (2) the amendment
terms must be fair and equitable when viewed in the context of
the reason for the amendment and in light of applicable stan-
dards of fairness. So reformulated, the Restatement section
89(a) test bears a striking resemblance to that derived from sec-
tion 2-209(1) of the UCC.
D. Duress by Wrongful Threat
Section 89(a) of the Restatement makes some amendments
enforceable despite the lack of consideration. When dealing with
the duress issue, sections 175 and 176, which are intended as a
restatement of the case law on duress by wrongful threat, should
also be consulted. Similarly, when deciding a case governed by
Article 2 of the UCC, section 2-209(1) is not the only avenue to a
resolution of the duress issue;" the case law concerning duress
seeable"; a circumstance can be unforeseen but foreseeable. Because any circumstance is
"foreseeable" in the sense of being susceptible to mental contemplation, when a judge
uses the term "not foreseeable," he presumably means "not reasonably foreseeable."
Because the Restatement § 89(a) test does not even require that the circumstances
be unforeseen, it is more liberal in enforcing amendments than either of the exceptions
to the pre-existing duty rule.
17. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 89, Comment b.
18. Like Restatement § 89, U.C.C. § 2-209(1) was designed primarily to overcome
620 [Vol. 33
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should also be consulted.' 9
The case law concept of duress by wrongful threat is indeed
relevant in the contract modification context. Duress by wrong-
ful threat exists if A assents to an agreement because of B's
wrongful threat and A has no reasonable alternative. 0 In the
words of section 175(1) of the Restatement, "If a party's mani-
festation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other
party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative, the con-
tract is voidable by the victim."'" In the contract modification
context, allegations of duress are usually based upon one party's
threat to breach the contract if the other party does not agree to
the amendment. The existence of duress depends upon whether
the threat was wrongful and whether the threatened party had a
reasonable alternative.
Although earlier decisions held that a threat to breach a
contract is generally not wrongful, the recent trend is to regard a
threat to breach as wrongful in the absence of circumstances jus-
tifying the threat.22 According to section 176(1)(d) of the Re-
statement, a threat to breach a contract is "improper" if "the
threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
the pre-existing duty rule in appropriate contract modification situations. Subsection (1)
contains but one brief sentence: "An agreement modifying a contract within this Article
needs no consideration to be binding." Comment 1 to § 2-209 states that "[t]his section
seeks to protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales
contracts without regard to the technicalities which at present hamper such
adjustments."
19. U.C.C. § 1-103 states that the statutory provisions of the U.C.C. are supple-
mented by "the principles of law and equity, including ... the law relative to ... du-
ress .... .
20. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNRmAcTs § 9-2 (2d ed. 1977) and
cases cited therein; Daizell, Duress by Economic Pressure (pts. I, II), 20 N.C.L. REv. 237,
341 (1942), and cases cited therein. The test for duress by wrongful threat was applied to
a contract modification in Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272
N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971):
A contract is voidable on the ground of duress when it is established that the
party making the claim was forced to agree to it by means of a wrongful threat
.... However, a mere threat by one party to breach the contract by not deliv-
ering the required items, though wrongful, does not in itself constitute eco-
nomic duress. It must also appear that the threatened party could not obtain
the goods from another source of supply and that the ordinary remedy of an
action for breach of contract would not be adequate.
Id. at 130-31, 272 N.E.2d at 535, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 25-26.
21. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 175(1).
22. See J. CALA uAI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 9-6 and cases cited therein.
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under a contract with the recipient."2 Good faith under the Re-
statement requires "faithfulness to an agreed common purpose
and consistency with the justified expectations of the other
party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as
involving 'bad faith' because they violate community standards
of decency, fairness or reasonableness. '24 The Restatement con-
cept of good faith is further explicated by references to the UCC
in the comments to section 205 and in Comment e to section
176.25 As noted above, the UCC standard of good faith for a
merchant seems to require amendment terms that are fair when
viewed in the context of the reason for the contract modification
and in light of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.
Thus, in the contract modification context, the contempo-
rary notion of duress by wrongful threat can be summarized as
follows: an amendment is voidable by A on the ground of duress
if (1) B wrongfully threatened to breach the original contract if
A did not agree to the amendment, and if (2) A agreed to the
amendment because she had no reasonable alternative; B's
threat was wrongful if the amendment terms are unfair when
viewed in the context of the reason for the threat and in light of
community standards of fairness. This concept of duress is simi-
lar to those derived from section 2-209(1) of the UCC and sec-
tion 89(a) of the Restatement. A major difference is that the
concept of duress by wrongful threat focuses on the situation of
the party alleging duress and requires a finding that she had no
reasonable alternative to the amendment. The UCC and the Re-
statement section 89(a) tests do not explicitly focus on this ele-
ment.26 Each of the three contemporary tests, however, seems to
23. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 176(1). "Every contract imposes upon each party
a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." Id. § 205.
24. Id. § 205, Comment a.
25. One sentence in Comment e to Restatement § 176 incorporates most of Com-
ment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-209. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 205, Comment a.
26. It should also be noted that the Restatement duress by wrongful threat test does
not expressly utilize the "unanticipated circumstances" requirement found in Restate-
ment § 89(a). Comment e to § 176 does, however, incorporate the U.C.C. requirement of
"legitimate commercial reason."
Comment e to § 176 presents an interesting little puzzle; it suggests, without expla-
nation, a difference between the § 176(1)(d) test and the § 89(a) test. Consider the first
few sentences in Comment e:
A threat by a party to a contract not to perform his contractual duty is not, of
itself, improper. Indeed, a modification induced by such a threat may be bind-
ing, even in the absence of consideration, if it is fair and equitable in view of
[Vol. 33
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require a judgment about the fairness of the amendment terms.
E. The Vagueness of "Fairness"
A major problem with these tests is the uncertainty created
by the word "fair." The word suffers from vagueness, and the
concept of fairness is incorrigibly subjective.
Little is gained by the UCC reference to "reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing in the trade"2 or the Restate-
ment reference to "community standards of decency, fairness or
reasonableness. '28 Ascertaining trade standards or community
standards is often a hopeless task; many persons do not have
any relevant standards, persons who do have standards seldom
articulate them, and the standards that have been articulated
are hardly uniform. Ascertaining the majority (or plurality) view
would require extensive opinion surveys conducted by social
unanticipated circumstances. See § 89. The mere fact that the modification
induced by the threat fails to meet this test does not mean that the threat is
necessarily improper. However, the threat is improper if it amounts to a breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing imposed by the contract. See § 205.
Id. § 176, Comment e. The sentence beginning with the words "[tihe mere fact" suggests
that a modification might fail to meet the § 89(a) test and yet not be the product of an
"improper" threat under § 176(1)(d). The enforceability of such an amendment appar-
ently depends upon the presence of consideration. If there is consideration, the amend-
ment is enforceable, since it is not voidable on the ground of duress under §§ 176(1)(d)
and 175(1). If there is no consideration, the amendment is unenforceable, since it is not
enforceable under § 89(a)(this assumes, of course, that the amendment is not enforceable
under § 89(b) or (c)).
A modification could fail to meet the § 89(a) test and yet not be the product of an
improper threat under § 176(1)(d) if the § 89(a) "fair and equitable" standard is a higher
standard than the § 176(1)(d) "good faith and fair dealing" standard, but this is unlikely.
After all, what is fair is fair. Another possibility is that a modification can fail to meet
the § 89(a) "unanticipated circumstances" requirement, even though it meets the "legiti-
mate commercial reason" requirement, incorporated into § 176(1)(d) by Comment e. If
so, this indicates some disparity between the "unanticipated circumstances" requirement
and the "legitimate commercial reason" requirement (see text accompanying notes 15 &
16 supra). The only other possibility is that the § 89(a) test is not met because one party
has already performed when the contract is modified.
27. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b).
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 205, Comment a. Both the U.C.C. and Restate-
ment references are supposed to assist in determining the meaning of "good faith." It
has been observed that the concept of good faith is basically "nothing more than a re-
quirement of fairness-a definition so broad as to be virtually meaningless." Hillman,
Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Eco-
nomic Duress, 64 IowA L. REV. 849, 877 (1979). The Hillman article provides a thorough
discussion of the rather unilluminating court decisions concerning U.C.C. § 2-209(1) and
good faith.
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scientists.2" Even if a survey identified a clearly prevailing view,
there would be reason to suspect that many respondents had not
accurately reported their own standards of fairness. Moreover,
even if the survey were accepted as a reliable reflection of the
respondents' real attitudes, the prevailing standard of fairness
may not be reasonable. Recall that the UCC refers to "reason-
able commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."3 0 If per-
vasive overreaching is condoned by most members of a trade,
then the conscientious judge will reject the trade standard as
unreasonable.1
A vague test should not be used if a better alternative ex-
ists. Rules of law should be as definite and precise as possible, so
that the legal consequences of contemplated conduct can be ac-
curately predicted, legal incentives for desired behavior can be
made effective, and excessive litigation can be avoided. Of
course, in the absence of a reasonable alternative, a vital legal
doctrine must be stated in vague terms. Nevertheless, before it
is concluded that duress is a necessarily vague doctrine in the
contract modification context, the possibility of a clear and spe-
cific test should be explored.
The task of formulating such a test is aptly described by
Calamari and Perillo:
[C]ourts have defended the pre-existing duty rule as a salutary
method of preventing the coerced modification of contracts.
Now that the Uniform Commercial Code and other legislation
permit a contractual modification without consideration it
seems clear that other techniques need to be developed to
avoid coerced modifications.
... It will, of course, require a good deal of creative inter-
pretation of the Code before standards are developed for dis-
tinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable demands for
29. Opinion surveys would be necessary because actual contracts and transactions
should not be accepted as accurate reflections of the standards adopted by persons in the
trade or community. A person's agreement to particular terms does not mean that he
regards those terms as fair. He may agree to terms he regards as unfair because he views
his alternatives as even worse.
30. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b)(emphasis added).
31. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-205, Comment 6 (a standard practice does not constitute a "usage
of trade" under § 1-205(2) if it is established that the practice is unconscionable or dis-








The remainder of this article presents an attempt to provide
some creative interpretation and develop some distinguishing
* standards.
II. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Because of the vagueness of fairness, the duress issue should
be analyzed without judging whether the amendment terms are
fair. An analytical framework that focuses on the objective eco-
nomic circumstances of each party at the time of contract modi-
fication will be useful. A basic assumption underlying this
framework is that one party has made a credible threat, either
explicit or implicit, to breach the original contract if the other
party does not agree to a particular contract amendment.
A. Harmless Amendments
There is no duress if performance of the amended contract
does not make the party alleging duress economically worse off
than she would be if the contract were performed according to
its original terms. For duress to exist, the threat must cause
harm.3 3 A's threat harms B only if it presents B with two alter-
natives, both of which are (from B's point of view) worse than
her status quo. For example, A obtains B's agreement to x by
threatening to do y if B does not agree to x. B prefers non-x,
non-y to either x or y, but prefers x to y, and, therefore, agrees
to x in order to avoid y. B is harmed no matter what she does.
But if B agrees to an amendment making her economically bet-
ter off than or as well off as the original contract would, she has
escaped harm and cannot be regarded as a victim of duress, no
matter how terrible her other alternative was. 4
32. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 20, § 5-15, at 195 (footnotes omitted).
33. See II G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 9.1 (1978). Duress is a subspecies
of coercion. Coercion exists when B does what A demands, even though it is harmful to
B, because A has threatened B with a worse harm if B does not comply with the demand.
In the law of contracts and the law of restitution, duress is coercion inducing an agree-
ment the law ought not to enforce. For a good discussion of coercion, see Bayles, A Con-
cept of Coercion, in COERCION 16 (Nomos XIV, J. Pennock & J. Chapman, eds. 1972).
34. If the amendment makes B better off than the original terms, not merely as well
off, her assent to the amendment has obviously not been coerced because it was not the
result of the threat. See note 33 supra. Because B would presumably have agreed to the
1982]
11
Mather: Contract Modification under Duress
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
626 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVEW [Vol. 33
Amendments of this kind ("Harmless Amendments") can be
eliminated from treatment as possible products of duress. Con-
sider, for example, a construction contract whereby the contrac-
tor is to build a garage on the east side of the owner's home. The
contract is modified, at the owner's insistence, to provide that
the garage will be constructed on the west side of the home. If
this modification results in no additional cost to the contractor,
it is a Harmless Amendment that benefits the owner and does
not make the contractor worse off than the original contract
would. The contractor is not a victim of duress. 5
B. Justifying Circumstances
With the elimination of Harmless Amendments, contract
modifications that do reduce the contractual rights and expecta-
tions of the party alleging duress can be considered. To deter-
mine which of these may properly be avoided on the ground of
duress, the examination will focus first on the objective eco-
nomic circumstances, at the time of modification, of the party
who threatened to breach. Did any objectively demonstrable in-
tervening circumstances render an exchange on the original con-
tract terms economically less beneficial to that party than he an-
amendment in the absence of A's threat, the threat was not a necessary cause of B's
assent. It is assumed that a party has no psychic aversion to contract modification per se
and that, if an amendment makes her better off economically, she prefers it "all things
considered."
One notion of duress suggests that even a mutually beneficial amendment, one that
makes both parties better off than would the original contract terms, might be regarded
as the product of duress. According to this notion, there is duress if one party exploits
superior bargaining power so as to impose terms that result in an excessively unequal
exchange of values. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L.
REv. 253 (1947). For a discussion of refusal to make a contract on reasonable terms as a
form of duress, see Dalzell, supra note 20, at 356-61. However, the question of nullifying
mutually beneficial agreements on the ground of unequal exchange can be analyzed more
conveniently under the doctrine of unconscionability, which is designed to deal with une-
qual exchanges. The "unequal bargaining power" variety of unconscionability was recog-
nized in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
In the years since the Dawson and Dalzell articles were written, the concept of uncon-
scionability has been enshrined in U.C.C. § 2-302 and Uniform Consumer Credit Code §
5.108 and has been further developed in numerous court decisions. In view of this devel-
opment, the defense of duress should be reserved for threats that are actually harmful to
the victim.
35. In Figure A, point a, represents a Harmless Amendment giving Buyer a gain of
$1000 from the contractual exchange and giving Seller a gain of $800. Point k represents
an original contract that apparently yields Buyer a gain of $700 and Seller a gain of $600.
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ticipated when he entered into the original contract? Any such
circumstances can be referred to as "Justifying Circum-










The figure merely depicts net gains or losses in dollars; it does not depict gains or
losses in actual utility.
Formation of an original contract at point k is the outcome of a two-person,
nonzero-sum, infinite, cooperative game. For definitions of these game-theory terms, see
W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY 205-07
(1973). The vertical line passing through point x represents the minimum dollar gain
Buyer can derive from the exchange and still be willing to contract with Seller. The
horizontal line passing through point y represents the minimum dollar gain Seller can
derive and still be willing to contract with Buyer. (Assume these minimum requirements
are determined by the alternative opportunities of the parties; for example, if Seller does
not contract with Buyer, he can sell to someone else at a $400 profit). If both parties
bargain efficiently, the original contract should lie somewhere within the "negotiation
set" represented by the segment between point x and point y of the (apparently) Pareto-
optimal contract curve cd.
An amendment at point a, indicates that the cd curve was not Pareto-optimal after
all and that both parties can do better by modifying the original contract.
36. The concept of Justifying Circumstances is similar to the concept of "legitimate
commercial reason" utilized in Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-209, except that it always re-
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ment terms obtained by the threatening party, they would ap-
pear to justify a request for some kind of amendment. Assuming
that the other party's circumstances have not changed, the ac-
tual social gain (the algebraic sum of the threatening party's net
gain or loss and the threatened party's net gain or loss) from the
exchange will be less than indicated by the expectations of the
parties at the time of original contract formation. In view of this
reduction in the social gain, some reallocation of the social gain
may be in order.
The following are examples of Justifying Circumstances: (1)
Seller demands an amendment increasing the contract price be-
cause the cost of some necessary input has risen since the origi-
nal contract was formed; (2) Seller demands a price increase
amendment because a third party has offered to pay more than
Buyer's contract price for the very same property or services (as-
suming that Seller is not a "lost-volume seller" and cannot de-
liver to both Buyer and third party);37 (3) Seller discovers that,
due to a mistake in his cost computations, he agreed to a con-
tract price below cost, and he now demands a price increase;B
quires that the circumstances be objectively demonstrable. Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-209
states that good faith in the case of a merchant "may in some situations require an
objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification." U.C.C. § 2-209, Comment 2
(emphasis added). The definition of Justifying Circumstances proposed in this article is
more in keeping with Comment b to Restatement § 89, which states that § 89(a) "re-
quires an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 12, § 89, Comment b.
Note that a Justifying Circumstance need not be unanticipated or unforeseen. Com-
ment b to Restatement § 89 suggests that an intervening circumstance might justify a
demand for contract modification, even though it was foreseen as a remote possibility.
Id. If some foreseen circumstances can justify demands for contract modification, no
foreseen event should be excluded on grounds that it was foreseen as a strong, rather
than remote, possibility. There is no way to ascertain that a person foresaw an event as a
strong possibility rather than a remote possibility.
37. Seller's performance of the original contract with Buyer would involve an oppor-
tunity cost equal to the additional profit Seller forsakes by performing his contract with
Buyer. From the economic point of view, an opportunity cost is like any other interven-
ing cost because it renders Seller's performance of the original contract more burden-
some than he had anticipated. It would thus seem to justify an attempt to modify the
contract. See Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 12, § 89, Comment b, Illustration 3; Posner, Gratuitous
Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 424 (1977).
38. Throughout this article it is assumed (1) that the original contract is not voida-
ble for mistake, (2) that no unforeseen hardship excuses performance of the original con-
tract on grounds of impossibility, impracticability, or frustration of purpose, and (3) that
no fraud or mistake exists that might make the amendment voidable. In short, the origi-
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(4) Buyer discovers that he cannot use goods ordered from Seller
for some of the purposes he had in mind when he entered into
the original contract and now demands an amendment reducing
the contract price.
C. Worse Alternatives
Focusing now on the objective economic situation, at the
time of contract modification, of the party alleging duress, would
this party's best available alternative to the amendment have
made her even worse off economically than would performance
of the amended contract?39 If so, she had only "Worse Alterna-
tives." The purpose of determining if the party alleging duress
had only Worse Alternatives is to ascertain whether her assent
nal contract is assumed to be enforceable, and the only issue is whether the amendment
is voidable for duress.
39. When the party alleging duress is a business, an alternative to the amendment
would leave the business economically worse off than the amendment does if it would
leave the business with smaller profits or larger losses. When the party alleging duress is
a consumer buyer, an alternative to the amendment would leave her worse off than the
amendment does if it would leave her with a smaller "consumer's surplus." As defined by
Alfred Marshall, the consumer's surplus is "[t]he excess of the price which he would be
willing to pay rather than go without the thing, over that which he actually does pay." A.
MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF EcONoMIcs, bk. III, ch. VI, § 1, at 124 (8th ed. 1920). Although
ascertaining the consumer's surplus is usually impossible, both the dollar amount the
buyer must pay under the amended contract terms and the net amount she would have
to pay for equivalent property or services if she were to utilize her best alternative can
frequently be ascertained. If this best alternative to the amendment would require the
buyer to pay more for equivalent property or services than the amended contract does,
the alternative obviously leaves the buyer with a smaller consumer's surplus.
Concentrating on objective economic circumstances means ignoring certain state-
ments made by the parties. Some courts and commentators have suggested that in decid-
ing whether there was coercion, one should note whether the party alleging duress as-
sented to the amendment under protest or assented willingly. See, e.g., United States ex
rel. Crane Co. v. Progressive Enterprises, Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1306 (E.D. Va. 1976); IA
A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 184; Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications under the
UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REv. 849, 870-73,
893, 898-99 (1979). Protest or lack of protest is seldom significant, however, and the
court's decision should not depend upon the vociferousness of the threatened party's
resistance. A person might vehemently protest a reasonable amendment and then agree
to it, not because she is coerced but because she finally perceives it to be fair. A person
who is really a victim of coercion might acquiesce without protest because she sees that
protest would be futile. Similar observations are made in Dalzell, supra note 20, at 382;
Note, Contracts-Modification Agreements: Need for New Consideration; Economic Du-
ress, 50 WASH. L. REv. 960, 975-76 (1975). One astute court observed: "Of course, protest
was a mere gesture unless there was duress in fact, and in that event, protest was unnec-
essary." Manhattan Milling Co. v. Manhattan Gas & Elec. Co., 115 Kan. 712, 721, 225 P.
86, 90 (1924).
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to the amendment was coerced. If she would have agreed to the
amendment even in the absence of the other party's threat to
breach, she was not coerced. The attempt to ascertain whether
she would have agreed to the amendment in the absence of the
threat involves a presumption that she sought only to maximize
her economic welfare, unless it can be inferred from the eco-
nomic circumstances that she had some noneconomic motive for
consenting to the amendment. 0
Thus, if the party alleging duress had only Worse Alterna-
tives, presumably she agreed to an economically harmful amend-
ment only because she wanted to avert alternativesi that were
economically even more harmful. Because the economic circum-
stances suggest no reason to infer that she had some
noneconomic motive such as generosity, it can be concluded that
she would not have agreed to the amendment in the absence of
the threat and, therefore, that her assent to the amendment was
coerced.
If the party alleging duress had (1) an alternative that was
not economically harmful' or (2) an alternative that would have
made her economically better off than does the amendment, but
would not have avoided economic harm altogether, it can be in-
ferred that she had some noneconomic motive for assenting to
the economically harmful amendment. It is uncertain, however,
whether that motive was such that she would have agreed to the
amendment in the absence of the other party's threat to
breach.42 Thus, it cannot be concluded that assent to the amend-
40. The presumption that a party seeks only to maximize her economic welfare is
based upon the belief that contracting parties usually have only self-interested economic
motives. Because a party's real motives cannot be determined with any certainty, pre-
sumptions must be made. If it is presumed that the party alleging duress consented to
the modification because of some motive other than maximization of her economic wel-
fare, it is difficult for her to establish that she was coerced; she cannot easily prove that
such a motive would not have led her to agree to the amendment even in the absence of
the threat.
41. A legal or extralegal remedy that prevents the other party's breach from having
harmful economic consequences is an example of this type of alternative.
42. We cannot know what the noneconomic motive was or how strong it was; we can
only guess. The threatened party may have had a purely psychic aversion to litigation or
any rupture of the contractual relationship, and this aversion-perhaps in combination
with some psychic attraction to the amendment-may have caused her to prefer the
amendment to the breach-and-remedy alternative, "all things considered." She might
nevertheless have regarded the amendment as less desirable than her original contract
rights, in which case she would not have agreed to the amendment in the absence of the
630 [Vol. 33
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ment was the result of coercion.43
Frequently, the threatened party has only Worse Alterna-
tives because the legal remedy for the threatened breach is not
only inadequate to provide her expectancy under the original
contract, but is so inadequate that it would leave her economi-
cally worse off than she is under the amended contract. There
are a number of possible reasons for inadequacy of legal remedy.
Buyer may be unable to recover damages for consequential
losses because they are not losses Seller had reason to foresee. In
some cases, Seller's breach prevents Buyer from taking advan-
tage of some other profitable business opportunity, but the lost
profits are not recoverable because they are too uncertain and
speculative. Buyer's or Seller's damages may be limited to an
inadequate amount by an enforceable liquidated damages clause
in the original contract. It may appear that the financial situa-
tion of the party threatening breach will render him wholly or
partially "judgment-proof." In some cases, the legal remedy for
breach will not be available soon enough to save the victim from
financial disaster. Frequently, the legal remedy for breach is in-
adequate because of the substantial uncertainty of winning the
lawsuit. Finally, every breach of contract involves transaction
costs; the victim must expend time and money in attempting to
achieve an out-of-court settlement, and, if litigation becomes
necessary, she incurs substantial attorney's fees that are seldom
legally compensable. Transaction costs alone are often sufficient
threat. (The psychic aversion to breach would not be a factor in the absence of a threat
to breach.) On the other hand, it is possible that the threatened party had such a strong
sense of generosity or sympathy for the other party that she preferred the economically
harmful amendment, not only to her best alternative when threatened with breach, but
also to her original contract rights.
43. The concept of "Worse Alternative" differs from the concept of "reasonable al-
ternative," the term used in Restatement § 175(1) and some other formulations of the
doctrine of duress by wrongful threat. "Reasonable alternative" appears to mean an al-
ternative that would have avoided harm altogether. See HI G. PALMER, supra note 33, §
9.5, at 264, § 9.12, at 325 (1978). In inquiring about alternatives, the purpose is to ascer-
tain whether the recipient of the threat was coerced into the coritract modification.
When the recipient of the threat had an economically better alternative, it cannot be
determined whether she would have chosen to modify the contract in the absence of the
threat, and it therefore makes no difference whether that alternative was harmful (an
"unreasonable alternative") or harmless (a "reasonable alternative"). The better ques-
tion is whether she had only Worse Alternatives. This question at least isolates modifica-
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to render the breach and remedy alternative economically worse
than the proposed contract modification.
In ascertaining whether the party alleging duress had only
Worse Alternatives, a court should consider not only her legal
remedies for breach but any other available alternatives. For ex-
ample, it cannot be said that Buyer had only Worse Alternatives
if, upon breach by Seller, Buyer could have purchased
equivalent property or services from another source at equal or
lower cost.
D. The Matrix for Harmful Modifications
In determining whether a harmful modification is voidable
for duress, two questions should be asked: (1) Did the party
threatening breach have any Justifying Circumstances? (2) Did
the party alleging duress have only Worse Alternatives to the
modification? The answers to these two questions will indicate
one of four possible situations, as shown in the matrix in Figure
1.
FIGURE 1
PARTY ALLEGING DURESS PARTY ALLEGING DURESS
HAD AN ECONOMICALLY HAD ONLY WORSE
BETTER (OR EQUALLY ALTERNATIVES
GOOD) ALTERNATIVE
PARTY THREATENING BREACH
HAD JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES 1 4
PARTY THREATENING BREACH
HAD NO JUSTIFYING 2 3
CIRCUMSTANCES
For each of the four possible situations, it must be determined
whether the amendment ought to be enforced.
III. THE SYMPATHETIC AMENDMENT
Consider first the contract modifications falling within Box
1 in the Figure 1 matrix. At the time of modification, the party
threatening breach has Justifying Circumstances, indicating that
performance on the original contract terms would be economi-
cally less beneficial to him than he anticipated when he entered
into the original contract. The threatened party has some alter-
native to the contract modification that is not a Worse Alterna-
632 [Vol. 33
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tive; she has an alternative that is economically better than or as
good as the amendment.
Suppose that Buyer and Seller form a sale of goods contract
with a contract price of $50,000, Seller anticipating costs of
$45,000. Seller subsequently discovers that his costs will be
$60,000. He requests an amendment increasing the contract
price to $60,000 and suggests that he cannot perform for
$50,000. Assume that if Buyer rejects the proposed amendment
and Seller breaches, Buyer will be able to cover by purchasing
equivalent goods elsewhere for $55,000 and will then be able to
recover $5000 damages44 but will incur a $1000 (estimated maxi-
muM) litigation expense. Buyer's net cost for the goods in the
event of Seller's breach would not exceed $51,000. Although
$51,000 exceeds the $50,000 original contract price, it is less than
the $60,000 amended price requested by Seller. Nevertheless,
Buyer agrees to the price increase amendment.
Such an amendment should be enforced. Seller's Justifying
Circumstance, his cost increase of $15,000, suggests that the ac-
tual social gain from the exchange is less than indicated by the
beliefs of the parties when the original contract was formed.
Some price increase may be justified to relieve Seller from bear-
ing the entire burden of the reduction in social gain. The fact
that Buyer had an alternative that was economically better than
the amendment does not necessarily mean that her assent to the
amendment was voluntary in the sense that she would have
agreed to the amendment even in the absence of Seller's threat
to breach.4 5 Buyer, however, must have had some noneconomic
motive for preferring the amendment to her economically supe-
rior alternative. 8 One very likely motive was sympathy for the
unlucky Seller, hence the label, "Sympathetic Amendment."
Buyer's noneconomic motive, whatever it was, may well have
been such that she would have agreed to the amendment even in
the absence of Seller's threat to breach. In doubtful cases, such
as Sympathetic Amendment cases, it should be presumed that
44. Buyer's damages would be the excess of her cost of cover ($55,000) over the
contract price ($50,000). U.C.C. § 2-712.
45. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
46. It is assumed that Buyer was not mistaken about the relative economic values of
her alternatives and that Seller has not deceived Buyer into believing that Seller has
Justifying Circumstances when there are none. See note 38 supra.
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Buyer's assent was voluntary rather than coerced, a presumption
that seems to be required by the general policy of enforcing
agreements unless it is probable that the agreement was not vol-
untary on both sides.47
Because Seller's cost increase justified a demand for some
price amendment, and Buyer's assent to the $60,000 price
amendment was presumably voluntary and not coerced, the
amendment should be enforced. If there is no coercion, there is
no duress. The Sympathetic Amendment appears to be merely a
voluntary adjustment of a contractual relationship that is not as
economically beneficial as expected.48
IV. THE UNLIKELY AMENDMENT
In situations falling within Box 2 in the Figure I matrix, the
party threatening breach has no Justifying Circumstances indi-
47. The presumption that Buyer's assent was voluntary is not a rebuttable pre-
sumption, susceptible to being overcome by factual evidence. The threatened party's
noneconomic motives and their relative intensity remain forever unknown, and the
finder of fact should not attempt to ascertain whether the threatened party would have
agreed to the amendment in the absence of the threat. Because the available evidence is
unreliable, the probability of coercion cannot possibly be established.
A hypothetical inquiry into what one party would have done if the other party had
done something else "is unsatisfactory because usually a matter of speculation." H.L.A.
HART & A.M. HONOR9, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 370 (1959). The threatened party's own
statements are likely to be self-serving, and it is also likely that she does not even know
precisely what her noneconomic motives were. As Freudian psychoanalytic theory sug-
gests, people often act on repressed motives and other motives of which they are not
conscious. The threatened party's conduct on similar occasions is not reliable evidence of
what she would have decided in the absence of the threat; no two situations are the
same, and even if they were, a person's motives vary from day to day and from situation
to situation. Nor can reliance be placed on knowledge about the usual motives people
have for acting in a particular way. A search for the threatened party's noneconomic
motives is a search for motives that are unusual in contract situations. Finally, it must
be acknowledged that the threatened party's decision probably involved a number of
motives and a balancing of conflicting desires and aversions. Even if these desires and
aversions could be identified, what the threatened party would have decided in the ab-
sence of the threat cannot be ascertained because methods for measuring the relative
intensity of such desires and aversions are lacking. The problem is illustrated in note 42
supra. For a discussion of this and other problems involved in the analysis of motivation,
see Alston, Motives and Motivation, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 399 (P. Ed-
wards ed. 1967).
48. In Figure A, supra note 35, the amendment represented by point a. is a Sympa-
thetic Amendment if Buyer had an economically better (or equally good) alternative to
the amendment. Note that point a, is below and to the left of the original contract curve
cd; this reflects the fact that the economic social gain derived from the exchange is less
than indicated by the parties' original expectations.
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cating that performance of the original contract would be less
beneficial to himself than he originally anticipated. The
threatened party agrees to the amendment even though she has
an alternative that would make her economically better off than,
or as well off as, the amendment; thus, she cannot be said to
have only Worse Alternatives.
Imagine a sale of goods contract with a contract price of
$100,000. Seller has no cost increase and has not discovered any
mistake in his original calculation of costs, but he nevertheless
demands an amendment increasing the contract price to
$110,000 and threatens to breach if his demand is not met. As-
sume that if Buyer rejects the proposed amendment and Seller
breaches, Buyer will be able to obtain equivalent goods else-
where at a total cost of $100,200 (a $100,000 price plus $200 in
transaction costs that are not worth suing for). Although
$100,200 is less than the amendment price of $110,000, Buyer
agrees to the amendment.
This is, of course, an unlikely scenario, hence the label,
"Unlikely Amendment." If Seller has not informed Buyer of any
intervening hardship with which Buyer can sympathize, it is un-
likely that Buyer would agree to the amendment when she has
an alternative that is economically better for herself. Suppose,
however, that Buyer does agree to the amendment-she may
have reevaluated the original contract terms and decided that
they were unfair to Seller, or she may have a sufficiently strong
psychic aversion to any rupture of her contractual relationship
with Seller.
The Unlikely Amendment does not present as strong a case
for enforcement as the Sympathetic Amendment, since Seller
has no Justifying Circumstances; nevertheless, the Unlikely
Amendment should be enforced. Because Buyer had an econom-
ically superior alternative, it can be inferred that she had some
noneconomic motive for agreeing to the amendment. That mo-
tive may have been such that she would have agreed to the
amendment even in the absence of the threat, in which case it
cannot be said that her assent to the amendment was coerced.
Like the Sympathetic Amendment, the Unlikely Amendment
should be enforced because of the general policy of enforcing
agreements unless it is probable that the agreement was not vol-
19821
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untary on both sides."9
V. THE HOLDUP AMENDMENT
Now consider contract modifications falling within Box 3 in
the Figure 1 matrix. At the time of modification, the party
threatening breach has no Justifying Circumstances and the
threatened party has only Worse Alternatives to the amend-
ment. Imagine a sale of goods contract with a $10,000 contract
price. Subsequent to the formation of the contract, Seller has
not encountered any intervening circumstances reducing his ex-
pected profit, but he nevertheless demands an amendment in-
creasing the price to $11,000 and threatens to breach if his de-
mand is not met. If Buyer rejects the amendment and Seller
breaches the original contract, Buyer can cover by obtaining
equivalent goods elsewhere at a cost of $12,000, paying a pre-
mium to obtain delivery on short notice. Buyer can then recover
$2000 damages from Seller, but her legal expenses will be at
least $1500. Thus, Buyer's net cost for the goods she needs will
be at least $11,500 if Seller breaches. If Buyer agrees to the
amendment, her cost will be $11,000. Buyer agrees to the
amendment.
The modification smells like a holdup, hence the label,
"Holdup Amendment." The courts have readily refused to en-
force Holdup Amendments,5" and this result seems proper. Be-
cause Buyer had only Worse Alternatives, there is no reason to
infer that noneconomic motives were present. Thus, it can be
inferred that her assent to the economically harmful amendment
was coerced; she would not have agreed to the amendment in
49. In Figure A, supra note 35, the amendment represented by point a, might be an
Unlikely Amendment. Because no Justifying Circumstances exist, the economic social
gain from the exchange is the same as indicated by the parties' expectations at the time
of original contract formation, and the parties are still on their original contract curve
cd Whether the move from point k to point a, illustrates an Unlikely Amendment or a
Holdup Amendment (see text at section V infra) depends upon whether Buyer had only
Worse Alternatives.
50. See, e.g., Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902)(modifica-
tion unenforceable under pre-existing duty rule); Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing
Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891)(modification unenforceable under pre-existing duty
rule); Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324
N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971)(modification unenforceable because of duress); King Constr. Co. v.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss4/3
CONTRACT MODIFICATION
the absence of the threat.51 Seller had no Justifying Circum-
stances indicating that the original contract would give him less
profit than he anticipated when he entered into the contract. In-
tuitively, it seems wrong for Seller to use a coercive threat
merely to increase his own gain at Buyer's expense. Intuitive
and subjective judgments about whether Seller's threat was
wrongful should, however, be avoided. Seller may have sincerely
believed that the original contract terms were unreasonably
favorable to Buyer and that he was justified in taking advantage
of economic circumstances to obtain fairer terms. A focus on ob-
jective economic circumstances provides justification for a legal
rille precluding enforcement of Holdup Amendments.
A. Holdup Bargaining Reduces the Prospects for Mutual
Benefit
The major function of contract law is to facilitate future ex-
changes 2 that are mutually beneficial.5 3 If two parties volun-
tarily agree to perform a future exchange of economic resources,
the exchange will presumably be beneficial to both parties; oth-
erwise they would not have agreed to it. In the language of wel-
fare economics, such an exchange is "Pareto-superior" 54 to no
exchange at all. Mutually beneficial exchanges are socially desir-
able because they increase aggregate welfare55 and also seem to
51. See text at section IIC supra.
52. A "future exchange" is an exchange not completed until some time after forma-
tion of an agreement to perform the exchange.
53. A good explanation of this function is contained in Birmingham, Legal and
Moral Duty in Game Theory: Common Law Contract and Chinese Analogies, 18 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 99, 103-10 (1969).
54. An allocation of resources is Pareto-superior to an alternative allocation if, and
only if, it makes at least one person better off and makes no one worse off. Coleman,
Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 513 (1980). See
also J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MCROECONOMic THEORY 286 (3d ed. 1980); C. ROWLEY
& A. PEACOCK, WELFARE ECONOMICs 7-10 (1975); A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL
WELFARE 21-24 (1970); A. SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 6-7 (1973); Coleman, Efficiency,
Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 221, 226 (1980).
A mutually beneficial exchange is Pareto-superior to no exchange at all so long as
the exchange produces no harmful effects on third parties.
55. Given the inability to make interpersonal utility comparisons, only when an ex-
change is Pareto-superior to no exchange at all is it certain that the exchange increases
aggregate utility. For a good explanation of this point, see I. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS 2-8 (2d
ed. 1978). If one party is made worse off by the exchange, it is not known whether his
loss in personal utility is exceeded by the other party's gain, because utility cannot be
1982] 637
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be just or, at least, more just than no exchange at all.6
Without adequate assurances that promises to perform fu-
ture exchanges will be kept, very few such exchanges would be
undertaken.57 Contract law provides such assurances in the form
of legal remedies (usually expectancy damages) that not only de-
ter each party from breaching, but also assure each party that he
will be compensated for any breach committed by the other
party. Contract law is in this way designed to facilitate mutually
beneficial future exchanges.
In order to perform this function, the legal system must dis-
tinguish between bargains that enhance the prospects for mutual
benefit and those that do not. This distinction suggests the rea-
son for not enforcing agreements tainted by fraud, duress, or in-
capacity. Any such defect in the bargaining process renders it all
cardinally measured for purposes of interpersonal comparison. If both parties are made
better off, it is apparent, without measuring either party's gain in utility, that aggregate
utility is increased.
56. A mutually beneficial exchange is more just or fair than no exchange at all be-
cause it would be preferred by any rational participant who is not afflicted with envy. It
does not matter whether the hypothetical rational participant steps into the role of
Seller or of Buyer; she will prefer the exchange even if she does not know whose shoes
she will step into. Assume that Buyer's and Seller's economic payoffs are as depicted in
Figure B below, and that when the exchange is completed, the hypothetical rational per-





If the hypothetical participant is allowed to choose her role, she will choose to be the
Seller and will prefer the exchange to no exchange at all. If she has to allow a second
hypothetical participant to choose a role and then herself play the remaining role, she
assumes she will end up as Buyer. She will, however, still prefer the exchange to no
exchange because she knows that, as Buyer, she will profit from the exchange. The con-
ceptual device of the rational chooser who gets "last choice" is suggested in J. FISHIIN,
TYRANNY AND LEGITIMACY 99-104 (1979). If the hypothetical rational participant stands
behind a "veil of ignorance" in a transactional version of John Rawls' "original position"
and has no idea which role she will end up playing, see J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
11-22, 118-50 (1971), she will still prefer the exchange because she will profit from it,
whether she steps into Seller's shoes or Buyer's. It is assumed that the hypothetical ra-
tional participant is self-interested, but it can be seen that she will prefer the exchange
to no exchange even if she is altruistic or has mixed goals.
57. When one party's expected gain from the exchange is discounted by the risk
that the other party will not perform and by his own aversion to risk, his expected gain
may not be a gain at all. See I. MACNEIL, supra note 55, at 65-66.
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too likely that the agreed-upon exchange would not be mutually
beneficial.
When the parties agree to a Holdup Amendment, the bar-
gaining has decreased the likelihood that the resulting exchange
will be mutually beneficial. In the hypothetical Holdup consid-
ered here, Seller has no Justifying Circumstances indicating that
an exchange on the original contract terms would be less profit-
able than he anticipated when he entered into the original con-
tract. Seller would presumably make a profit without any con-
tract modification, and assuming that the original contract was
voluntary on both sides, an exchange on the original contract
terms would be mutually beneficial. Buyer, on the other hand,
has agreed to an amendment that makes her economically worse
off than would the original contract terms (she has agreed to pay
$11,000 rather than $10,000) and has done this to avoid an eco-
nomically worse alternative (she has only Worse Alternatives).
The coercive modification thus introduces the risk that the ex-
change will not be beneficial to Buyer; she may have agreed to
amended terms that will yield her a net loss in order to avoid an
even greater net loss from Seller's breach.
Because the coercive Holdup Amendment is not necessary
to assure Seller of a profit and does introduce the risk that
Buyer will suffer a loss, it reduces the likelihood of mutual bene-
fit and should not be enforced. A Holdup Amendment is not jus-
tified by any need to adjust the contract terms in view of a
change in the expected social gain; it is merely a coerced reallo-
cation of the same social gain.
5 8
B. Enforcement is not Necessary to Induce Performance
that is Pareto-superior to Breach
It might be suggested that a Holdup Amendment should be
58. In Figure A, supra note 35, the amendment represented by point a, is a Holdup
Amendment if Buyer had only Worse Alternatives; otherwise it is an Unlikely Amend-
ment. The economic social gain (the sum of the two dollar payoffs) is unchanged by the
move from the original contract at point k to the amendment at point a,. Buyer is pre-
sumably coerced into the move if she has only Worse Alternatives.
At point a,, Buyer still has a beneficial exchange. In the real world, however, it is
often difficult or impossible to ascertain whether the Holdup Amendment results in a
losing exchange for the victim of the threat, and it is convenient and prudent simply to
declare all Holdup Amendments unenforceable because they increase the risk that the
exchange will not be mutually beneficial.
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enforceable if performance of the contractual exchange is better
for both parties than a breach and if enforceability of the
amendment is necessary to induce the threatening party to per-
form rather than breach. Surely, legal rules should provide in-
centives for choosing the Pareto-superior alternative.
In our hypothetical Holdup situation, performance of the
exchange at any price from $10,000 to $11,000 is indeed better
for both parties than breach. Performance at the amended price
of $11,000 or any lower price must be better for Buyer than
Seller's breach would be; otherwise Buyer would not have agreed
to the amendment in order to avert breach. Performance at the
original contract price of $10,000 or any higher price must be
better for Seller than his breach would be. Because he has no
Justifying Circumstances, such performance yields Seller a profit
no smaller than the profit he was willing to take when he made
the original contract. His breach of the original contract, how-
ever, would subject him to liability for damages of $2000 and to
additional transaction costs, leaving him with a net payoff worse
than the gain he can make by performing.5 9 In this hypothetical
situation, as in any Holdup situation, performance is better for
both parties than breach.
But even if Holdup Amendments are not enforceable,
threatening parties will perform rather than breach. The Seller
in the hypothetical will still deliver the goods, even if he knows
that the amendment is unenforceable, because performance at
the original contract price makes him better off than would his
breach.60 Indeed, a legal rule making Holdup Amendments un-
59. If he breaches, Seller can probably resell the goods at a profit, but he cannot
resell the goods at a price above Buyer's contract price because it is assumed that Seller
has no Justifying Circumstances, and it must therefore be assumed that he does not have
an opportunity to sell the goods to a third party at a higher price. Any such opportunity
would create an opportunity cost and constitute a Justifying Circumstance. See notes 36-
38 and accompanying text supra. Thus, Seller's profit from the resale cannot exceed his
profit from performance of the contract. Because his profit from resale would be offset to
some extent by the damages he pays to Buyer and by his other transaction costs arising
from breach, Seller's breach would make him economically worse off than would per-
formance of the contract at any price equal to or exceeding the original contract price.
60. Seller's threat to breach converts what began as an infinite game into a finite
game. Once the threat has been made, two moves remain; each move requires a choice
between two alternatives. First, Buyer moves; she either accepts the amendment or re-
jects it. Then Seller moves; he either performs or breaches. The situation can thus be
depicted in a matrix. For an illustrative use of the matrix form in threat and promise
situations, see T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 123-37 (paperback ed. 1963).
[Vol. 33
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enforceable would seem to do a better job of inducing perform-
The matrix in Figure C below depicts a Holdup situation. For each possible out-
come, Seller's payoff is shown below and to the left of Buyer's. Each party's payoff value
reflects his ordinal ranking of his possible payoffs. Buyer, for example, most prefers a
payoff of 4 and least prefers a payoff of 1. It is assumed that each party knows the law
and knows his own payoff possibilities but is not aware of the other party's legal knowl-
edge or payoff possibilities.
FIGURE C
BUYER
AGREES TO AMENDMENT REJECTS AMENDMENT
SELLER
3 4
PERFORMS 4 3 B4
IF AMENDMENT IF AMENDMENT




IF AMENDMENT IF AMENDMENT
ENFORCEABLE * UNENFORCEABLE
Assume first that Holdup Amendments are enforceable. If Seller has made a credi-
ble threat to breach in the event that Buyer rejects the amendment, Buyer will agree to
the amendment because a payoff of 3 is preferable to a payoff of 2 (the payoff to Buyer
when Seller breaches after Buyer rejects the amendment). Seller will then perform (a
payoff of 4 is preferable to a payoff of 2).
Now assume that Holdup Amendments are not enforceable. If Seller has made a
credible threat to breach in the event that Buyer rejects the amendment, Buyer will
agree to the amendment (a payoff of 4 is preferable to a payoff of 2, and even if it is later
determined by a court that the amendment is not a Holdup Amendment and is enforcea-
ble, a payoff of 3 is preferable to a payoff of 2). Once Buyer has agreed to the amend-
ment, Seller will perform (a payoff of 3 is preferable to a payoff of 1, and if the amend-
ment turns out to be an enforceable amendment and not a Holdup Amendment, a payoff
of 4 is preferable to a payoff of 2). Thus Seller will perform regardless of whether Holdup
Amendments are legally enforceable or unenforceable.
If Seller will perform anyway, how is Buyer's agreement to the amendment ex-
plained? Buyer would insist on the original contract terms if she knew that Seller would
perform anyway. But Buyer does not know that Seller will perform anyway. She may
fear that Seller will breach in order to make future threats more credible or that Seller
will act irrationally or that Seller has a secret opportunity to resell the goods to a third
party at an increased profit. For whatever reason, Buyer may not be willing to reject the
amendment and take the risk that Seller will carry out his threat. In evaluating possible
rules of law, certain assumptions about the rational behavior of sellers in general must be
made. In a real life situation, however, a buyer does not have this luxury; she is dealing
with a particular and somewhat unpredictable seller, and she is making her decision with
imperfect knowledge about the seller's situation. For example, this discussion assumes
that evidence introduced at trial has established that Seller had no Justifying Circum-
stances. In making her decision to accept or reject the amendment, Buyer does not have
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ance than would a rule making such amendments enforceable.01
Throughout this article, it has been assumed that the threat to
breach is credible. If Seller's threat is not credible, however,
Buyer is likely to reject the amendment because it would make
her worse off economically than do the original contract terms.
If Buyer rejects the amendment, Seller may be tempted to
breach in order to make future threats more credible.6 2 A clear
rule making Holdup Amendments unenforceable reduces the
chances of such a breach, because it reduces the chances that
Seller will make a holdup threat in the first place; he gains noth-
ing if the amendment obtained by the threat is unenforceable
and Buyer knows this.e3 Thus, for the purpose of inducing per-
formance, a legal rule precluding the enforcement of Holdup
Amendments seems more effective than a rule making such
amendments enforceable.
VI. THE DuA DSmTRESS AMENDMENT
Consider, finally, contract modifications falling within Box 4
in the Figure 1 matrix. At the time of modification, the party
threatening breach has some Justifying Circumstances, and the
threatened party has only Worse Alternatives. Imagine a sale of
goods contract with a contract price of $10,000. When he entered
into the contract, Seller, a manufacturer, estimated that his
costs would total $8000 and that he would thus derive a $2000
profit from the transaction. Seller now discovers that his costs
will be $12,000. He demands an amendment increasing the price
to $13,000 and informs Buyer that he cannot perform for
$10,000. If Buyer rejects the amendment and Seller breaches,
Buyer can obtain equivalent goods for $10,800 and can then re-
cover $800 damages (cost of cover minus contract price) by in-
curring at least $500 in legal expenses. Buyer will be unable to
effect cover in time to prevent a consequential loss of $4000,
the benefit of this evidence.
61. See Posner, supra note 37, at 423 n.29.
62. Seller may feel that even if his breach does not make Buyer change her mind
about the amendment, his own enhanced credibility in the future is worth a sacrifice of
gain in the present transaction,
63. If a contemplated amendment is a Holdup Amendment, Seller probably recog-
nizes it as such. He knows he has no Justifying Circumstances, and he undoubtedly as-




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss4/3
CONTRACT MODIFICATION
which is not compensable because it relates to a business oppor-
tunity of which Seller had no reason to know." If Buyer rejects
the amendment and Seller breaches, Seller's best course of ac-
tion is to refrain from producing the goods and pay $800 to
Buyer so as to avoid litigation expense and limit his breach-
related transaction costs to $200. After the parties consider their
respective alternatives, Buyer agrees to the amendment and
Seller performs.
It is difficult to decide whether such an amendment should
be enforced; each party was in distress, hence the label, "Dual
Distress Amendment." Buyer presumably agreed to pay $13,000
for the goods because she had only Worse Alternatives. If she
had rejected the amendment, Seller's breach would have re-
sulted in Buyer incurring total costs of at least $14,500.5 Inas-
much as Buyer was presumably coerced into the amendment, a
court should be reluctant to enforce it. On the other hand,
Seller's Justifying Circumstance of a $4000 cost increase would
seem to justify a demand for some modification of the contract.
Seller was not engaged in a holdup; he was attempting to adjust
the contract terms so as to avoid a $2000 loss. The Dual Distress
Amendment is perplexing because of the haunting suspicion that
the amendment obtained by means of coercion is nevertheless a
justifiable modification of original contract terms that were no
longer mutually beneficial.
Unfortunately, existing legal authority provides little help.
A number of cases involving Dual Distress Amendments have
undoubtedly been decided, but it is difficult to identify them.
Many cases clearly involve Justifying Circumstances, but the ju-
dicial opinions usually fail to disclose whether the threatened
party had only Worse Alternatives to the amendment.6 6 Nor
64. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
65. Total cost to Buyer equals cost of cover ($10,800) minus damages ($800) plus
transaction costs (at least $500) plus opportunity cost ($4,000).
66. A case that does appear to involve a Dual Distress Amendment is Goebel v.
Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284 (1882). The seller ice company had contracted to fur-
nish the buyer brewery with its ice requirements for a specified period. Because of a
partial failure of the ice "crop," ice was in short supply, and sales at the original contract
price would have resulted in severe financial loss for seller. Buyer had no alternative
source of ice. Without ice its beer inventory would have spoiled, and buyer would proba-
bly have been put out of business. A contract modification increasing the price from
$2.00 per ton to $3.50 per ton was held enforceable and not voidable for duress. The
court observed that in view of the unforeseen circumstances, the contract modification
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have the commentators dealt with the Dual Distress Amend-
ment as a discrete category of contract modification.17
A. Inducing Performance Which is Pareto-superior to
Breach: The Inducement Term
It has been suggested that Holdup Amendments generally
decrease the chances that the resulting exchange will be mutu-
ally beneficial." It cannot be said, however, that Dual Distress
Amendments generally increase or decrease the likelihood of a
mutually beneficial exchange. A Dual Distress Amendment in-
creases the chances that the party threatening breach will realize
a net benefit; it offsets at least partially his expectancy reduction
caused by his intervening Justifying Circumstances. But the
Dual Distress Amendment also increases the chances that the
threatened party will suffer a net loss from the exchange; in or-
der to avoid a Worse Alternative, she may have agreed to
amended terms subjecting her to a net loss.
In any Dual Distress situation, performance of the contract
on the amended terms makes both parties better off than they
would be if the threatening party were to breach the original
contract. Presumably, the threatened party agreed to the
amendment because she recognized that performance of the
amended contract places her in a better position than would
breach of the original contract. Assuming that the threatening
party really intends to perform the amended contract,6 9 it can be
was fair and may have provided the only means for averting financial disaster for both
parties.
Other cases that appear to involve Dual Distress Amendments include Rexite Cast-
ing Co. v. Midwest Mower Corp., 267 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. App. 1954)(court applied the pre-
existing duty rule and held the modification unenforceable); Schwartzreich v. Bauman-
Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921)(modification held enforceable, pre-exist-
ing duty rule circumvented by finding of mutual rescission of original contract).
67. Richard Posner has distinguished three situations in which contract modifica-
tions might be sought. Posner, supra note 37, at 421-24. Posner's first and second situa-
tions involve what this article describes as Holdup Amendments. His third category ap-
parently includes some Sympathetic Amendments and some Dual Distress Amendments
(the party seeking the modification has encountered an unexpected event which prevents
him from performing without a contract modification). Although Posner does not deal
with the Dual Distress Amendment as a discrete category, he apparently believes that
modifications fitting within his third category should generally be enforced.
68. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
69. It is conceivable that the threatening party has no intention of performing and
is merely obtaining the modification in order to reduce the damages he will have to pay
[Vol. 33
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presumed that such performance also places him in a better po-
sition than would breach; otherwise he would have breached in-
stead of agreeing to the amendment.
Inasmuch as performance of the amended contract is
Pareto-superior to breach of the original contract, the legal sys-
tem ought to encourage performance. Whether Dual Distress
Amendments must be legally enforceable in order to induce con-
tractual performance should, therefore, be considered. Holdup
Amendments need not be enforceable in order to induce per-
formance. In many Dual Distress situations, however, the party
confronted with Justifying Circumstances will breach the origi-
nal contract unless he knows that a contract modification will be
enforceable. In any situation in which the threatening party
would be better off by breaching than by performing the original
contract, he will be tempted to breach if there is a significant
risk that a contract modification will be held unenforceable and
that he will thus be limited to his rights under the original
contract.70
In the hypothetical example, if Seller had known that a con-
tract modification would be unenforceable, he probably would
have breached the original contract rather than modify it and
perform. If he were to modify the contract and perform but re-
ceive only the original contract price of $10,000, he would suffer
a $2000 loss as a result of the amendment being unenforceable.
If he were to breach the original contract, he would suffer only a
$1000 loss -(an $800 payment to Buyer plus $200 transaction
costs). If Seller knew, however, that a contract modification
would be enforceable, he would obtain the price amendment and
perform the amended contract, confident of his legal right to a
$13,000 price and a $1000 profit.
71
when he breaches. But if it can be shown that he planned to breach in any event, the
modification would probably be unenforceable because of fraud. The threatening party's
express or implied promise to perform the amended contract, when he intends not to
perform, is a misrepresentation of fact. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERMLO, supra note 20, § 9-
19 and authorities cited therein.
70. In a Holdup situation, the threatening party has no Justifying Circumstances,
and breach cannot make him better off than would performance of the original contract.
See note 59 and accompanying text supra. In a Dual Distress situation, the threatening
party has Justifying Circumstances, and his breach would make him better off than
would performance of the original contract if his Justifying Circumstances have reduced
his contract expectancy below the level of his net payoff from breach.
71. Making Dual Distress Amendments enforceable does not always guarantee that
1982]
31
Mather: Contract Modification under Duress
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The Dual Distress Amendment need not, however, be en-
forceable to its full extent in order to induce the threatening
party to modify the original contract rather than breach it. The
amendment need only be enforceable to the extent that it makes
the threatening party better off than his breach of the original
contract would. In the hypothetical example, Seller will -enter
into a modification and agree to perform for the amended price
of $13,000, so long as he knows that the amendment will be en-
forced at least to the extent of a price exceeding $11,000. If
Seller is assured of receiving more than $11,000, his performance
will yield him something better than the $1000 loss he incurs if
he breaches the original contract. Since $11,000 is the marginal
price term necessary to induce Seller to modify the original con-
tract rather than breach, it will be referred to as the "Induce-
ment Term." The Inducement Term is the adjusted amendment
term that, if enforced, would make the threatening party as well
off as would his breach of the original contract. In order to deter
the threatening party from breaching the original contract, the
law need only make the Dual Distress Amendment enforceable
to an extent exceeding the Inducement Term.
7 2
B. The Limited Efficacy of Economic Analysis
A court should not assume that it must either enforce the
Dual Distress Amendment according to its terms or hold the
amendment completely unenforceable. Partial enforcement of
the Dual Distress Amendment may be preferable to an all-or-
the amended contract will be performed. In some situations, the party who threatened to
breach the original contract will be tempted to breach the amended contract because he
has discovered that breach of the amended contract will make him better off than per-
formance of the amended contract would. This possibility arises if the amendment suffi-
ciently reduces his potential liability for breach. Although making Dual Distress Amend-
ments enforceable does not always assure performance of the amended contract, it at
least induces contract modifications that are mutually beneficial if performed and, in
many cases, also provides sufficient inducement for performance of the amended
contract.
72. In Dual Distress situations in which performance of the original contract would
make the threatening party better off than his breach would, there is no Inducement
Term. The amendment need not be enforceable to any extent in order to deter the
threatening party from breach. As in the Holdup situation, he will perform whether or
not the amendment is legally enforceable. Such a situation arises when the threatening
party's Justifying Circumstances have not reduced his contract expectancy to the level of
his net payoff from breach.
[Vol. 33646
32
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss4/3
1982] CONTRACT MODIFICATION 647
nothing approach. 3 Economic analysis does not indicate the ex-
tent to which the amendment should be enforced.
The Pareto-superiority principle suggests that the amend-
ment should be enforced at least to an extent exceeding the In-
ducement Term but does not indicate whether the amendment
should be enforced to any further extent. In our hypothetical
example, the Pareto-superiority principle suggests that the
amendment should be enforced at a price exceeding $11,000 (the
Inducement Term) but not exceeding $13,000 (the amendment
term). At any price in this range, the modification is Pareto-su-
perior to breach of the original contract, because it places both
parties in a better position. No one price within that range, how-
ever, is Pareto-superior to any other price within the same
range.
7 4
Nor is a determinate solution reached by applying Richard
Posner's wealth maximization test. In Posner's view, economic
efficiency means the maximization of aggregate wealth,7 5 with
aggregate wealth defined as "the value in dollars or dollar
equivalents... of everything in society. It is measured by what
people are willing to pay for something or, if they already own it,
what they demand in money to give it up. ' Under Posner's
73. According to John Dawson, "[t]he broad limitation that emerges from the mod-
em cases is that relief for duress will be given only for the purpose of restoring the excess
over what is reasonably and justly due, and to the extent that such excess is shown to
exist." Dawson, supra note 34, at 283. In keeping with this purpose, it may be appropri-
ate to enforce a Dual Distress Amendment to the extent that no unjust enrichment re-
sults. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-302(1)(court may nullify an unconscionable contract or clause "or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result"). But see Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D.
Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
911 (1980)(no court-imposed adjustment of price term amendment is available under
U.C.C. § 2-209).
74. For example, performance at an enforced price of $12,500 makes Buyer better
off than performance at an enforced price of $13,000, but it makes Seller worse off; thus,
a $12,500 price is not Pareto-superior to a $13,000 price.
75. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 10 (2d ed. 1977). The
wealth maximization test must be distinguished from the Pareto-superiority test. An ex-
change maximizes aggregate wealth (compared to no exchange at all) when Seller gains
wealth and Buyer loses wealth, and Seller gains more than Buyer loses. Such an ex-
change, however, is not Pareto-superior to no exchange at all, because it places Buyer in
a worse position.
76. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119
(1979). Although Posner uses the quoted definition of "wealth" in presenting wealth
maximization as a normative concept, he would presumably be willing to use the same
definition as the equivalent of "value" in stating that "efficiency" (used as a technical
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wealth maximization approach, it does not matter how aggregate
wealth is distributed between two parties, so long as it is maxi-
mized in the aggregate. The wealth maximizer would make our
hypothetical Dual Distress Amendment enforceable at some
price exceeding $11,000 but not exceeding $13,000. This result
facilitates an exchange that gives each party more wealth than
he would have in the absence of the exchange. The wealth maxi-
mizer is, however, indifferent to the price Buyer is required to
pay, so long as it exceeds $11,000 and does not exceed $13,000.
Whether Buyer pays $11,500 or $12,500 or $13,000, aggregate
wealth is the same.
No test for economic efficiency indicates the extent to which
the Dual Distress Amendment should be enforced.77 Neverthe-
less, a court should not simply assume that the amendment is
fair and that it should be enforced according to its terms. If the
hypothetical amendment were enforced to the full extent of
$13,000, Buyer would be forced to bear three-fourths of the bur-
den of Seller's $4000 unanticipated cost increase. This result
seems unjust because Seller's cost increase is the consequence of
his failure to estimate his own costs accurately. Thus, there is
good reason to suspect that the amendment term involves unjust
enrichment. Economic analysis will neither confirm nor nullify
this suspicion. Although economic analysis indicates that certain
allocations are efficient, it cannot determine which of these effi-
cient allocations are equitable.
C. Effecting an Equal Allocation of the Intervening Burden:
The Equitable Term
So long as a Dual Distress Amendment is enforced to an
extent exceeding the Inducement Term, it should be enforced
only to the extent that it is equitable. An equitable amendment
and positive, rather than normative, term) means exploiting economic resources in such
a way that value is maximized. See R. PosNER, supra note 75, § 1.2, at 10.
77. In addition to Pareto-superiority and wealth maximization, there are other no-
tions of economic efficiency; for example, allocative efficiency, Pareto-optimality, and
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. These notions of economic efficiency are discussed in Coleman,
Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to
Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1980). See also Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509 (1980). None of these tests for economic efficiency
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term is one that allocates the threatening party's intervening
burden equally between the parties; it will be referred to as the
"Equitable Term." In the hypothetical example, the Equitable
Term would be a price term of $12,000. The threatening party's
intervening burden (Seller's Justifying Circumstance) was a cost
increase of $4000. Increasing the enforceable contract price by
$2000 (from $10,000 to $12,000) results in each party bearing
one-half of Seller's cost increase. Thus, a court should enforce
the amendment, not to its full extent of $13,000, but only to the
extent of $12,000.78
An equal allocation of the threatening party's intervening
burden is justified by the notion that the law should accord
equal treatment to equally legitimate interests. John Coons has
argued that "[a]bsent a relevant factor peculiar to one dispu-
tant, justice is governed by a presumption of equal desert, and
an even apportionment is required. 7 9 A presumption of equal
desert seems as arbitrary as any contrary presumption (for ex-
ample, a presumption that plaintiffs are twice as deserving as
defendants). Nevertheless, as Coons observes, the presumption
is reflected in much of our law, including the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution."0
In the Dual Distress case, no arbitrary presumption in favor
of equal treatment is needed. Equal allocation of the intervening
burden is indicated by the roughly equal weight of the equities
in favor of each party. Both parties appear to be innocent of
moral turpitude. The party threatening breach has Justifying
Circumstances and is thus justified in seeking some modification
of the original contract. It is not unreasonable for him to bargain
for the most favorable amendment he can obtain. There is cer-
tainly no reason to suggest that the threatened party is guilty of
moral turpitude. Furthermore, a policy favoring nonenforcement
of the amendment roughly counterbalances a policy favoring en-
forcement. The libertarian policy of protecting persons from co-
ercion81 suggests that a Dual Distress Amendment should not be
78. In this example, the $12,000 Equitable Term exceeds the $11,000 Inducement
Term.
79. Coons, Compromise as Precise Justice, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 250, 252 (1980).
80. Id. at 256-57.
81. The policy of preserving individual freedom and preventing coercion is pervasive
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enforced at all because the threatened party was presumably co-
erced into the amendment. On the other hand, the party who
obtained the amendment by means of a threat has a reasonable
expectation that the other party will perform the contract as
amended. The policy of protecting reasonable expectations"
thus suggests that the amendment should be fully enforceable.
If both parties are innocent and the conflicting policies bal-
ance each other, the judicial decison should provide an equal al-
location of the intervening burden.83 Such a decision recognizes
the equally meritorious conduct of the parties and promotes
each of the competing policies to some extent. It does not rest
upon an arbitrary presumption of equal desert, but rather upon
a showing that there really is equal desert. It thus conforms to
the Aristotelian notion that justice requires a distribution of
shares in proportion to what people deserve.8'
in contract law. According to Kessler and Gilmore, case law reveals two primary aspects
of freedom of contract: "(1) there can be no contracts by compulsion, and (2) the parties
are free as to the content of their contracts." F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS 36
(2d ed. 1970). In particular, the voidability of contracts on the ground of duress stems
largely from a desire to relieve a person from agreements that are not produced by her
"free will." See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 492 (1932) ("Duress ... means...
any wrongful threat ... that induces another to enter into a transaction under the influ-
ence of such fear as precludes him from exercising free will. . . . "); Austin Instrument,
Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 130, 272 N.E.2d 533, 535, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1971)
("A contract is voidable on the ground of duress when it is established that the party
making the claim was forced to agree to it by means of a wrongful threat precluding the
exercise of his free will."). Although such definitions of duress have been abandoned
because they are vague and unworkable, they do evidence a basic policy underlying the
legal doctrine of duress.
82. According to Corbin, the main underlying purpose of the law of contracts is to
effect the "realization of reasonable expectations that have been induced by the making
of a promise." 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1, at 2.
In many Dual Distress cases, the threatening party has also engaged in detrimental
reliance. If his breach of the original contract would have made him better off than
would performance of the original contract, his performance of the amended contract is
rendered in reliance upon the amendment. Without the amendment, he would not have
performed. He has, however, relied on the other party to perform the amended contract
only to an extent exceeding the Inducement Term; he has not relied on the other party
to fully perform the amended contract. Thus the policy of protecting detrimental reli-
ance supports enforcement of the amendment only to the point at which it exceeds the
Inducement Term.
83. See Coons, supra note 79, at 259-60.
84. The ratio between A's distributive share and B's distributive share should be the
same as the ratio between A's desert and B's desert. ARISTOTLE, NCHOMACHEAN ETHICS
bk. V, § 3, at 118-19 (M. Ostwald trans. 1962).
Other normative theories lend additional support to the proposal to enforce the
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Note that it is the intervening burden-not the social gain
Dual Distress Amendment only to the extent of the Equitable Term, the term that allo-
cates the intervening burden equally between the parties. These theories also appear to
support the proviso that Dual Distress Amendments must be enforceable beyond the
extent of the Inducement Term. Although some of these theories were not designed for
individual transactions, they all express notions of justice that are suitably applied to the
Dual Distress Amendment.
James Fishkin suggests that in evaluating alternative social policies, we ask which
policy would be selected by a hypothetical rational person who knows that he will be left
with the position (under the selected policy) that remains after everyone else has se-
lected a position. J. FsmHuN, supra note 56, at 99-101. Fishkin's device is an adaptation
of John Rawis' imaginary situation in which one person divides a cake and gets the last
piece remaining after the other persons involved have selected their pieces. Id. In the
hypothetical Dual Distress situation, the policy question is how Seller's $4000 cost in-
crease will be allocated between the two parties. A rational person who knows that he
will bear whichever share the other person has rejected will choose to divide the burden
equally. If he chooses a $3000-$1000 distribution, he must expect the other person to
elect to bear only $1000 of the cost increase. Fishkin's hypothetical cake-cutter would
also prefer a contractual performance that makes both parties better off than does
breach and thus would be willing to choose an unequal division of the intervening bur-
den when that is necessary to induce performance. See note 56 supra.
Equal allocation of the intervening burden can also be supported by an application
of Douglas Rae's "principle of simple justice." Under Rae's principle, a more equal allo-
cation should be chosen rather than a less equal alternative, unless the less equal alter-
native makes some social strata better off and makes none worse off. In other words,
justice requires the most equal allocation available, unless there is an alternative that is
Pareto-superior. See Rae, A Principle of Simple Justice, in PHILOSOPHY, POLTCS AND
Socwry 134, 138-49 (5th Series, P. Laslett & J. Fishkin eds. 1979). If Rae's principle is
applied to the hypothetical Dual Distress situation, the intervening burden (Seller's
$4000 cost increase) should be divided equally between the two parties unless an alterna-
tive allocation would make one or both parties better off without making either party
worse off. The only unequal allocation that is Pareto-superior to an equal allocation is
one that is necessary to induce Seller to perform rather than breach; it is Pareto-superior
in the sense that it is required by a legal rule that must be made known to the parties in
advance so that they will perform an exchange that is Pareto-superior to a breach of the
original contract. Thus Rae's principle leads to the solution proposed in this article for
Dual Distress Amendments: so long as the amendment is enforced beyond the extent of
the Inducement Term, it should only be enforced to the extent of the Equitable Term.
This solution is also the indicated outcome if John Rawls' maximin criterion is ap-
plied to the two-person amendment conflict. The maximin criterion requires a choice of
the allocation that maximizes the worst payoff. J. RAwLS, supra note 56, at 152-53
(1971). If a fixed sum is being distributed and an equal allocation is an available alterna-
tive, the maximin criterion obviously requires equal allocation since the worst payoff in
any unequal allocation is worse than the "worst" payoff in an equal allocation. Thus, the
maximin criterion indicates that the intervening burden in the Dual Distress situation
should be allocated equally between the two parties (the Equitable Term). The maximin
criterion points, however, to an unequal allocation if that is necessary to induce a con-
tractual performance that makes both parties better off than they would be under a rule
requiring equal allocation but failing to induce such performance.
Normative concepts have crept into welfare economics. For a discussion of the no-
tion that an allocation of a fixed bundle of goods is fair if it is both Pareto-efficient and
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or loss from the contractual exchange-that is to be allocated
equally. In the Dual Distress situation, the real issue is the allo-
cation of the intervening burden that is imposed by one party's
Justifying Circumstances and which results in a coercive modifi-
cation of the contract. The other burdens and benefits of the
exchange should be allocated by the original contract terms,
which are validated by untainted bilateral consent. Note also
that in allocating the intervening burden equally, the court does
not simply split the amount in dispute."' Although this would
equally promote the competing policies of relieving the
threatened party from a coercive agreement and protecting the
other party's reasonable expectations, a court should not use the
amendment as its starting point. The amendment should be
viewed as an abortive attempt to do what the court must now do
equitably.
D. Summary of the Proposed Solution
The following solution to the Dual Distress dilemma is thus
suggested: a Dual Distress Amendment should be enforced at
least to the extent that it makes the threatening party better off
than he would be had he breached the original contract; but so
long as this is accomplished, the amendment should be enforced
only to the extent of an equal allocation of the intervening bur-
den created by the threatening party's Justifying Circumstances.
In other words, a Dual Distress Amendment should be enforced
to an extent exceeding the Inducement Term, but so long as this
is done, the amendment should be enforced only to the extent of
equitable, see H. VARIAN, MICROECONoMic ANALYSIS 225-26 (1978). An allocation is equi-
table if no one prefers anyone else's payoff to his own. Id. An allocation is Pareto-effi-
cient if there is no alternative that would make everyone better off. Id. at 57, 145. See
also Varian, Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and the Theory of Fairness, 4
PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 223, 240-47 (1975). In the Dual Distress context, if a fixed-sum
burden is being distributed, Varian's concept of equitable allocation seems to require an
equal allocation; only then will neither party regard the other party's payoff as preferable
to his own. An allocation must, however, be both Pareto-efficient and equitable in order
to qualify as a fair allocation. In the solution proposed in this article, an unequal alloca-
tion is permitted if necessary to induce a performance that makes both parties better off
than would breach. This would not be a "fair allocation" in Varian's terms because it is
"Pareto-efficient" but not "equitable."
85. In our hypothetical example, the amount in dispute is the difference between
the $13,000 amended price and the $10,000 original contract price.
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The Inducement Term provides a floor, and the amendment
term agreed to by the parties provides a ceiling. So long as it
exceeds the floor and does not exceed the ceiling, the amend-
ment term enforced by the court produces an outcome that is
Pareto-superior to breach of the original contract. In order to
produce the most equitable Pareto-optimal outcome, the court
enforces the amendment to the extent of the Equitable Term. A
just allocation of the threatening party's intervening burden is
thus achieved by employing the Pareto-superiority criterion and
the equal allocation principle in that order.
The Dual Distress Amendment is distinguished from the
Sympathetic Amendment and the Unlikely Amendment in that
it is presumably coercive in nature. It is distinguished from its
coercive cousin, the Holdup Amendment, because it reflects an
attempt to allocate an intervening burden, a reduction in the so-
cial gain derived from the contractual exchange. The Dual Dis-
tress Amendment is an allocation, albeit a procedurally defective
one, of a fixed sum that has been added to the social cost and
suggests a need for contract modification. 7 The Holdup Amend-
ment, on the other hand, is a coercive reallocation of the same
social gain allocated by the original contract terms. It is the out-
come not of a fixed-sum game, but of a zero-sum game in which
one party takes away what the other party previously had.
E. Problems in Ascertaining the Equitable Term and the
Inducement Term
Our hypothetical Dual Distress Amendment involved a
price increase obtained by a seller confronted with an interven-
ing cost increase. Given the hypothetical facts, it was easy to
ascertain the Equitable Term and the Inducement Term. Do se-
86. If the Inducement Term is more favorable to the threatening party than the
Equitable Term, the court should nevertheless enforce the amendment to an extent ex-
ceeding the Inducement Term.
87. In Figure A, supra note 35, point a3 represents a Dual Distress modification if
Buyer had only Worse Alternatives. Otherwise it reflects a Sympathetic Amendment. At
point a,, the social gain is not as great as it would be at point k or at any other point on
the original contract curve cd. Unfortunately, Seller's Justifying Circumstances have ren-
dered impossible any exchange on what originally appeared to be the contract curve. The
move from point k (the original contract) to point a, reflects the allocation of a $300
fixed-sum reduction in social gain.
1982] 653
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rious problems arise when other types of Dual Distress Amend-
ments are involved?
1. Quantifying the Intervening Burden.-In order to ascer-
tain the Equitable Term, the court must quantify the interven-
ing burden being allocated by the amendment. This task is diffi-
cult if a consumer-buyer is confronted with a partial frustration
of purpose and obtains a Dual Distress Amendment reducing the
contract price. The intervening burden is the reduction in the
subjective value, to the consumer, of the seller's performance
and is equal to the excess of (i) the maximum amount the con-
sumer would have been willing to pay when he entered into the
original contract, over (ii) the maximum amount he is willing to
pay in view of his intervening frustration of purpose. Unfortu-
nately, the maximum amount the consumer would be willing to
pay at any point in time cannot be ascertained.
In such a situation, the finder of fact must estimate what a
reasonable person with the consumer's interests, tastes, and
financial situation would be willing to pay.8 Two estimates are
necessary, one corresponding to the consumer's situation at the
time of original contract formation and one taking into account
the intervening frustration of purpose. Although this method
produces grossly inaccurate estimates of the intervening burden,
the problem will not arise often because consumer buyers are
seldom able to obtain Dual Distress Amendments.
8 9
88. Cf. Harris, Ogus & Phillips, Contract Remedies and the Consumer Surplus, 95
L.Q. REv. 581 (1979)(suggesting that when other remedies for breach are inappropriate,
an aggrieved consumer buyer should be awarded damages compensating him for his lost
consumer's surplus-the amount by which contract price is exceeded by the maximmn
amount a reasonable person in buyer's position would have been willing to pay).
89. Quantifying the intervening burden may appear difficult in other situations. The
intervening burden may be an intervening risk of some loss that may or may not occur
but is nonetheless a risk that qualifies as a Justifying Circumstance. Such a risk need not
be quantified. The risk will have been allocated by the contract amendment (a new in-
demnification, warranty, or other risk of loss provision), and when one party seeks to
enforce that amendment, the court can arrive at the Equitable Term by simply making
an equal allocation of the loss that has actually occurred.
Quantifying the intervening burden does become difficult as one moves along Ian
Macneil's spectrum, away from discrete transaction contracts and toward ongoing rela-
tionship contracts involving the sharing of benefits and burdens that are hopelessly non-
quantifiable. For explications of Macneil's model of transactional and relational con-
tracts, see I. MACNEIL, supra note 55, at 12-16; Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-
Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law,
72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854 (1978); Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. LAW
REV. 691 (1974); Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60 VA.
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2. Nondivisible Amendments.-The Equitable Term allo-
cates the intervening burden equally between the parties. If the
contract modification involves a term that, unlike the price
term, is not divisible, how does the court make an equal
allocation?
Suppose that Seller contracts to sell Buyer a machine for
$50,000 and deliver the machine to point A. Later, Seller discov-
ers that delivery to point A will cost him $3000 more than he
had anticipated. He informs Buyer that he will not be able to
perform unless Buyer agrees to modify the place of delivery
from point A to point B. Delivery to point B will result in
Seller's total costs being $1000 less than he originally antici-
pated. Taking delivery at point B will impose an additional
$2000 transportation expense on Buyer. Nevertheless, Buyer
agrees to the amendment because she has only Worse
Alternatives.
In ascertaining the Equitable Term, it must first be recog-
nized that the intervening burden being allocated by the amend-
ment is not Seller's potential $3000 cost increase. This cost in-
crease has been avoided by a modification of Seller's contractual
performance which results in only a $1000 increase in the social
cost of the exchange. (Seller's costs are reduced by $1000, and
Buyer's costs are increased by $2000.) The Equitable Term allo-
cates this $1000 cost increase equally between the two parties.
Assuming that point A and point B are the only practicable
delivery points, the amendment term is not divisible; Seller
must deliver at either point A (the original contract term) or
point B (the amendment term). The obvious solution is to en-
force the amendment but grant Buyer a $1500 reduction in the
price so that each party's net gain will be reduced $500. When-
ever the Dual Distress Amendment involves a nondivisible term,
the price term can be adjusted so that the net result is the eco-
nomic equivalent of enforcing the amendment to the extent of
the Equitable Term.
3. Estimating the Consequences of a Breach that Did Not
Occur.-In establishing the Inducement Term, the court must
ascertain the economic position the threatening party would
L. REv. 589 (1974). In the context of highly relational contracts, the analytical framework
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have occupied had he breached the original contract. The In-
ducement Term is the amendment term that would put the
threatening party in an equivalent position. Estimates must be
made of the damages the threatening party would have paid and
the legal fees and other transaction costs he would have incurred
as a result of his breach.
Fortunately, the court needs only a reasonable estimate of
the minimum amounts and does not need to ascertain what the
precise damages and transaction costs would have been. The law
must assure the threatening party that the court will make him
better off than he could possibly have been had he breached the
original contract. If it is established that he would have been
liable for at least $20,000 in damages, that he would have in-
curred at least another $1000 in transaction costs, and that he
could have derived no wholly or partially offsetting benefit from
breach, the Inducement Term is an amendment term that gives
him a $21,000 net loss.
The court must also estimate the consequences of breach in
order to determine whether the threatened party had only
Worse Alternatives to the amendment; unless the threatened
party had only Worse Alternatives, there is no Dual Distress
Amendment.° To ascertain whether the threatened party's re-
jection of the proposed amendment would have made her eco-
nomically worse off than the amendment, an estimate must be
made of the damages she would have recovered and the transac-
tion costs she would have incurred had she rejected the amend-
ment and suffered a breach by the other party. Here, too, precise
figures are unnecessary. If there was a substantial risk that, de-
spite reasonable efforts to mitigate losses, the breach would have
left the threatened party worse off than the amendment, the
court should find that she had only Worse Alternatives.
VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of duress in contract modification requires analy-
sis more rigorous than that performed by courts in the past. The
tests provided by contemporary contract law are inadequate, be-
90. Under the traditional doctrine of duress by wrongful threat, the economic conse-
quences of a breach would have to be calculated in order to ascertain whether the
threatened party had a "reasonable alternative" to the amendment. See notes 21 & 43
and accompanying text supra.
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cause each of them makes the judicial decision hinge upon a
hopelessly subjective and unpredictable determination of
whether the amendment terms are fair.
Courts should focus on the objective economic circum-
stances existing at the time of contract modification. Two ques-
tions should be answered.' 1 The first question is whether the
party threatening breach had any Justifying Circumstances. A
Justifying Circumstance is some objectively demonstrable inter-
vening circumstance indicating that an exchange on the original
contract terms would be economically less beneficial to the
threatening party than he anticipated when he entered into the
original contract. The second question is whether the threatened
party had only Worse Alternatives to the amendment. A Worse
Alternative is one that would have-made the threatened party
economically worse off than would performance of the amended
contract.
When these two questions are answered, the contract modi-
fication can be placed in one of four categories, as shown in Fig-
ure 2.
FIGURE 2
PARTY ALLEGING DURESS PARTY ALLEGING DURESS
HAD AN ECONOMICALLY HAD ONLY WORSE
BETTER (OR EQUALLY ALTERNATIVES
GOOD) ALTERNATIVE
PARTY THREATENING BREACH SYMPATHETIC DUAL DISTRESS
HAD JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AMENDMENT AMENDMENT
PARTY THREATENING BREACH UNLIKELY HOLDUP
HAD NO JUSTIFYING AMENDMENT AMENDMENT
CIRCUMSTANCES
When it is alleged that a contract modification was obtained
by means of duress, courts should employ the following rules:
(1) A Sympathetic Amendment should be enforced accord-
ing to its terms because it is presumably noncoercive.
(2) An Unlikely Amendment should be enforced according
to its terms because it is presumably noncoercive.
91. For an analysis focusing on the same two questions but reaching different con-
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(3) A Holdup Amendment should be declared unenforceable
because it is presumably coercive, and enforceability does not
facilitate mutually preferable outcomes.
(4) A Dual Distress Amendment should be enforced at least
to an extent that makes the threatening party better off than he
would be had he breached the original contract. So long as this
is accomplished, the amendment should be enforced only to the
extent that it provides an equal allocation of the intervening
burden that it distributes. Although the Dual Distress Amend-
ment is presumably coercive, partial enforcement is required in
order to facilitate mutually preferable outcomes and to recognize
equally legitimate interests.
(5) A Harmless Amendment (not shown in Figure 2, which
depicts only "harmful" amendments) is not coercive and should
be enforced according to its terms. A Harmless Amendment is
an amendment that does not make the party alleging duress eco-
nomically worse off than she would be under the original con-
tract terms.
These proposed rules for duress are designed to produce
outcomes that are both predictable and just. The legal system
should provide something more than a perfunctory assurance
that contract modifications will be enforced if they are "fair."
When a contract is formed, the parties become fellow prisoners
in the relationship they have created. Although they cannot es-
cape the obligations of their relationship, they should be assured
that they can modify those obligations when they both desire.
But the contractual relationship involves dependence, and de-
pendence invites coercion and exploitation. Confronted with a
coercive modification of the contract, a court must do what the
parties were unable to do. It must prevent exploitation and give
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